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Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the negative correlation between stock market returns in
the United States (measured by the risk premium of the S&P 500 Index) and the respective
volatility of these returns. The academic research regarding two primary schools of thought on
this issue, the volatility feedback effect and the leverage effect, is furthered as potential
explanations for this phenomenon. A tertiary explanation relating to investor behavior is also
explored as a viable cause. In order to empirically study this relationship, I examine the risk
premium quintiles and the corresponding CBOE Volatility Index levels for the time-series dating
from January 2, 1990 to June 29, 2018. This approach differentiates from the stochastic and
autoregressive volatility models that attempt to explain this relationship, by examining the
distribution of the negative return-volatility correlation. Results from this analysis serve to better
understand the properties of volatility and their impact on investments.
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INTRODUCTION

Defining Volatility
Volatility has long had its place in the financial markets. Defined in a general sense as the
standard deviation of asset returns (usually annualized), it provides an important metric of
dispersion that investors can use to guide their decisions. An essential distinction, however, is
that volatility is not equivalent to risk. Premier investor Warren Buffet spoke of this from a more
macro standpoint, stating that equities will always be a more volatile asset class than cashequivalents, but that does not mean they are riskier (Buffet, 2014). He was referring to the
common practice of aligning risk with volatility, despite risk reflecting downside fluctuations
and volatility representing fluctuations in both directions. Volatility, hence, has no information
regarding the shape of equity returns (Poon, 2005).
While volatility as a concept appears rather simple in nature, it in itself has several
variations that should be distinguished. It can vary across different asset classes as Buffet noted,
different individual securities, as well as across different lengths of time. It also can be referred
to as realized volatility, having occurred across a historical time horizon, or as implied volatility,
an estimate for the volatility at a future point in time. For this paper, the volatility in question
will be measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, referred to
as the VIX.

VIX
As the primary metric in study, an overview of the VIX is warranted. The CBOE
Volatility Index measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index with an average expiration
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of 30 days. It uses near-term (weekly) and next-term (monthly) call and put options with 23 to 37
days to expiration, and calculates a weighted 30-day variance. Upon taking the square root of
this variance and multiplying by 100, the result is the VIX level noted on the index (CBOE, n.d.)
Quoted in percentage points, it represents the expected standard deviation of the S&P 500 Index
over the next year -- at a 68% confidence level or one standard deviation. It is of note that the
VIX has been observed to overestimate the volatility of the stock market when compared to the
realized volatility for the respective time horizon, a phenomenon referred to as the volatility or
variance premium. This premium, as measured by implied minus realized volatility, averages
approximately 3% (Eraker, 2007). The VIX will be used as a proxy for conditional or implied
volatility throughout this paper. A graph of the VIX is found below, spanning from 1990 until
present day.

Figure 1 (FRED, 2019).
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Introduction
This forward-looking, option-derived metric possesses an incredibly interesting
characteristic that has long been a subject of interest in academic research -- it is highly
negatively correlated to the stock market’s returns. As illustrated by the figure above, the VIX
tends to spike significantly during recessions and fall during strong bull markets. Two schools of
thought dominate the aforementioned relationship. The first, the volatility feedback effect,
primarily stemmed from French, Schwert, and Stambaugh in 1987. Their premise was that as
volatility increases, the required rate of return for the security increases, thus further discounting
the cash flows and lowering the stock price. (French, Schwert, Stambaugh 1987). Additional
analysis between the weighted average cost of capital for a large-cap equity sample and
accompanying VIX levels indicate support for this claim, as well as academic research on price
shocks and their volatility impact. The second school of thought regarding this relationship is
referred to as the leverage effect. First introduced by Fischer Black in 1976, the leverage effect
was theorized to occur when there was a decline in stock price, which would then increase the
relative level of leverage at the firm level -- leading to further volatility (Black, 1976). This
effect faced both support and opposition, however, as it was found to vary upon the time horizon
in study, and failed to incorporate all-equity financed companies. Lastly, a third explanation for
the return-volatility association appeals to the behavioral aspects of investing, citing the
investor’s tendency for loss aversion as a cause for the asymmetry.
While these theories have been extended to international equities, applied to highfrequency data, and modeled in several environments, the distribution of the return-volatility
association lacks significant exploration. My analysis of using a quintile and decile approach
sheds light on the asymmetry of this already asymmetric relationship, while providing validation
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to its extreme nature. The concentration of correlations in extreme quintiles in this time series
provide support for primarily the volatility feedback effect, which favors large short-term
changes in asset prices and volatility. These findings can then be applied to the ever-increasing
securitized volatility market, with implications in hedging, arbitrage, and predictive strategies.

VOLATILITY FEEDBACK EFFECT

The premise of volatility having a negative relationship with stock market returns due to
some kind of “feedback” has been the focal point of several prominent financial scholars.
French, Schwert and Stambaugh first explore this relationship in the context of expected returns
and volatility, finding a positive relationship. They claim that this then induces a negative
relationship between realized returns and “unpredicted” (i.e. implied) volatility, in which an
increase in volatility feeds back into each firm by requiring a higher discount rate. Cash flows
remaining unchanged, the increased discount rate would lower the net present value of the firm -and thus the current stock price in accordance with a discounted cash flow methodology (French,
Schwert, Stambaugh 1987).
Additionally pivotal to their findings was their methodology for returns. Rather than
using the stock market returns for their indices in study, the market risk premium was used in its
place. Concordant with Fama and French’s Three Factor Model, the market risk premium
accounts for different interest rate regimes, as well as the expected equity return in excess of the
risk-free security rate (Fama, French 1992). The market risk premium (equity premium) is often
used to explore the return-volatility relationship, and will be used in this paper’s analysis later
on.
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Unaddressed by French, Schwert, and Stambaugh, however, was the question as to what
would cause the initial changes in volatility. Volatility can be impacted on the macro level by
political events or global economic data, but can also be effected at the firm level by the release
of company-specific information. The latter was the focus of Campbell and Hentschel, who
provided the example of a dividend announcement inducing a volatility feedback effect.
Logically, a “negative” announcement about dividends would increase future volatility because
of the concept that volatility is persistent. The required rate of return would thus be higher,
decreasing the stock price and further amplifying the volatility. Likewise, a “positive”
announcement increases volatility, but the volatility of the stock’s returns is dampened due to a
higher discount rate. Caught in the midpoint between these two extremes is no news (lack of
volatility), which was found to increase the stock market return (Campbell, Hentschel 1991).
In order to provide evidence to the existence of this volatility feedback effect, a
methodology of modeling the stock returns and volatility must be used. A primary technique first
used in the context of feedback by Campbell and Hentschel was a generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) process. The crux of this type of model is that it
assumes error variance is not uniform but rather heteroskedastic. Additionally, the error variance
is autoregressive; thus it depends on the previous time period’s variance. The GARCH process is
frequently used to model the volatility of stock market returns, for it exhibits several
heteroskedastic and autoregressive properties (Ruppert, 2011).

International Evidence
The use of these models has allowed significant evidence of this effect to compile. On the
international front, corroboration of this feedback was found in several studies. GARCH models
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for the volatility of indices in Hong Kong and Taiwan markets (Hong Kong Hang Seng Index
and Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Index) provide support for an asymmetric volatilityreturn relationship (Yeh, Lee 2000). Using a sample period from May 22, 1992 to August 27,
1996, it was found that the impact of a negative unexpected shock (i.e. bad news) on future
volatility was significantly larger than the impact of a positive unexpected shock (good news) -indicating an asymmetric relationship attributable to volatility feedback. Additional international
evidence can be found in emerging markets, specifically in India. Equities in emerging markets
are essential to consider because of their different properties from typical developed countries
and economies. These differences include a low correlation with developed markets, more
predictable returns, higher average returns, and higher volatility (Bekaert and Wu, 2000). These
distinguishable properties thus pose a potential resistance to the existence of this particular
effect. Using closing stock price data for the primary index in India (the BSE 500 Index) from
July 26, 2000 to January 20, 2009, asymmetric volatility was found to indeed still be prevalent in
India, confident at the 1% level when modeled through a nonlinear asymmetric model (GARCH)
(Goudarzi, Ramanarayanan 2011). The same occurrence of negative shocks inducing more
volatility than a positive shock attributed to the existence of a feedback effect, despite different
equity market characteristics.

Extreme Cases
In order to further examine the validity of the volatility feedback effect, it is important to
consider the extremes; i.e. the extreme downside movements in stock market prices and volatility
levels. Wagner and Aboura (2010) use sample data from January 2, 2000 to September 30, 2008,
comprised of S&P 500 Index and the aforementioned CBOE Volatility Index closing levels --
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which includes extreme observations from the dotcom bubble, 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Using a GARCH model for these volatility-shock periods, they
found significantly stronger evidence of volatility asymmetry in which VIX spikes corresponded
with large market price drawdowns; more so than normal volatility levels (Wagner, Aboura
2010). The exaggerated asymmetry during periods of financial or economic shock provides
evidence that a specific effect, namely “extreme volatility feedback”, is causing the conditional
volatility to spike in response to a large drop in security prices.
Many of the aforementioned studies examined price data of the S&P 500 Index using
daily prices across several years, occurring decades in the past. The environment and nature of
the United States equity market and equity markets worldwide, however, have changed
significantly. As of 2017, quantitative and passive investing accounted for about 60% of trades in
the United States. Of the segment comprising quantitative investing, high frequency trading
accounts for 52% of the 60% -- with technology and speeds nonexistent a decade earlier (Cheng
2017). Understanding the volatility-return relationship requires an analysis of this highfrequency data, in order to see its implications for the validity of effects like the volatility
feedback effect. Such analysis could also assist in explaining the causality and timing of the
relationship: Under the feedback effect does higher volatility lead to lower returns, or do lower
returns lead to higher volatility?
In their study of the leverage and volatility effects, Bollerslev, Litvinova, and Tauchen
address these essential issues. In order to obtain high frequency data, they used tick-by-tick S&P
500 futures data from January 4, 1998 to March 9, 1999 because of the trading frequency and
low trading costs in this market. They discovered that asymmetric volatility did in fact appear, in
which large declines in five-minute S&P 500 futures data were accompanied by a spike in
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market volatility (Bollerslev, Litvinova, Tauchen (2006). Their findings came to question,
however, the logistics and practicality of the volatility feedback effect. How could companies be
revising their required rate of return (which would thus lower the stock price) on a tick-by-tick
basis? Or does the market instantly price in volatility changes as immediate revisions to costs of
capital? Perhaps the explanation is another effect, or combination of effects, entirely.

Empirical Test
A potential way to determine the validity of the volatility feedback effect is to examine
the relationship between the aggregate weighted average cost of capital of a group of firms (or an
index), and the VIX. According to the volatility feedback effect, these two should be positively
correlated -- as volatility increases, the cost of capital rises as a result. Using a random sample of
10 companies from the Dow Jones Industrial Index and standardized values for the VIX and
WACC on a three month basis from March 31, 2000 to December 31, 2018, the resulting
correlation was 0.0789. The regression results are listed below.

Table 1.
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While not significant at the 95% level, the positive association between the standardized
values of the VIX and the average of 10 Dow Jones Industrial Index companies’ weighted
average cost of capital provides some insight as to the relevance of the volatility feedback effect.
A larger sample of firms, as well as more frequent data for WACC values could yield results in
further support of this effect, and would be a valuable area for future research.

LEVERAGE EFFECT

A competing school of thought for the explanation behind the volatility-return
relationship in equities is referred to as the leverage effect. First defined by Fischer Black in his
paper Studies of Stock Prices Volatility Changes, it cites leverage as the primary reason for stock
return volatility. The reasoning is as follows: As a firm experiences a decline in price (and thus
in its market value of equity), its relative amount of debt compared to equity increases. With
more leverage, the firm is likely to be more volatile, consistent with the well-documented
research between debt/equity ratios and volatility (Black, 1976). The following figure (Figure 2)
illustrates this relationship, sorting firms by leverage decile and plotting against monthly
volatility of equity (Chorro et al., 2018). It is important to note that while the extreme deciles of
leverage do experience higher equity volatility, it is difficult to ascertain a relationship between
debt/equity and volatility for the middle deciles.
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Figure 2.

While Black’s theory appeals logically, the explanatory power of the leverage effect was
found to be rather limited -- if present at all. The study by Chorro et al. examined the returns of
the S&P 500 Index over a 25-year time horizon, using a GARCH model to disentangle the
leverage effect’s contribution to the asymmetrical volatility-return relationship. In line with the
plot illustrated above, leverage effects were found to be a statistically relevant characteristic in
only 30% of firms in the S&P 500. When viewed in aggregate as compared to at a firm level, the
explanatory contribution of the leverage effect decreased even more so.
The implications of financial leverage impacting returns and volatility in an asymmetric
manner also rely on the time horizon in question. Pan and Liu utilize several extensions of
GARCH models to examine the short-term and long-term impacts of leverage on volatility, using
historical daily closing levels of the S&P 500 Index from January 2, 1991 to December 31, 2015.
They concluded that the leverage effect existed in some manner for the short-term, but lacked
statistical significance in the long-term. Additionally, negative shocks to the S&P 500 index had
a much larger effect on volatility via the leverage effect than shocks in the positive direction
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(Pan, Liu 2017). Much like the analysis for the volatility feedback effect, however, the impact of
the effect could be different when examined over an even shorter horizon: high frequency. Due
to the noise associated with high frequency data including bid-ask variations, liquidity
constraints, and trading mechanics, disentangling these biases has proved difficult for researchers
(Ait-Sahali, Fan, Li 2011). Using a new class of models called multivariate high-frequencybased volatility models (abbreviated HEAVY), however, Noureldin, Shephard, and Sheppard
were able to find evidence for the leverage effect in high frequency data while accounting for
this noise (Noureldin et al., 2011). The authors do not separate this effect from the volatility
feedback effect, however, and thus one must approach their estimations with caution.
The general conclusion amongst scholars regarding the leverage effect is that it has some
explanatory merit for the asymmetric volatility puzzle, but not as much as the volatility feedback
effect or other underlying characteristics. Some, however, make the claim that this relationship is
not due to leverage at all. If the leverage effect explains the negative relationship between
volatility and stock market returns, then companies with no financial leverage should exhibit
different return-volatility relationships than their levered counterparts. This was the premise of
Hasanhodzic and Lo in their study of all-equity financed firms from 1972 to December 2008.
They found an equally strong (if not stronger) negative relationship between stock returns and
their respective volatility for these all-equity financed firms when compared to the study’s
universe of levered companies (Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2011). They thus directly dispute Black’s
claim that leverage plays an explanatory role in the return-volatility relationship. The leverage
effect therefore appeals logically but appears to contribute little to nothing towards the
phenomenon of asymmetric volatility.
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INVESTOR BEHAVIOR

While mathematical models for volatility have adduced explanatory power to the
volatility feedback effect, and to some extent the leverage effect, much about the relationship
remains unexplained. This has led some to claim that the underlying cause of asymmetric
volatility may be simply due to the nature of investor behavior.
The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), despite being a measure of aggregate implied
volatility, has become known as the “Fear Gauge”. It has in some cases become synonymous
with risk, and yet does not fit risk’s own definition. The reasoning behind this is likely due to
investor behavior. In an examination of past volatility’s effect on investor’s future judgements,
Du and Budescu displayed historical data for 80 stocks to participants in the study, and asked
them to forecast the prices of these stocks in the future. They found a negative relationship
between volatility and forecasts, meaning that for stocks with higher volatility, individuals
underestimated the actual price of the stock in the future (Du and Budescu, 2007). These
implications could feasibly be carried out in the stock market and pose an explanation to the
volatility asymmetry. As volatility increases, an investor’s expected return for a stock decreases
or the stock is avoided altogether (sold or lack of demand), thus lowering the price of the stock.
This concept of loss aversion is highly related to volatility. Loss aversion refers to the
tendency to have a higher sensitivity to losses as opposed to gains (Barberis and Huang, 2001).
While volatility merely represents the standard deviation of stock returns, investors in
accordance to loss aversion would be more wary of larger variations because they represent the
possibility of a larger loss. Since the relationship in study is between realized returns and
conditional (implied) volatility, the negative association becomes even stronger. As stock prices
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decrease, investors are highly sensitive to the loss and thus forecast future volatility to be even
higher. Reversing the causality, as volatility increases, the potential for a larger loss rises and
stock prices drop to reflect the loss aversion. While this explanation is linked to the previous two
effects tied to asymmetric volatility, it differs in the sense that the aversion is present at the
investor level, as compared to at the firm level.
Asymmetric volatility at the market level is the crux behind behavioral explanations for
its causation. Hibbert et al. cite “affect heuristics” (rules of thumb or practices based on
instinct/intuition) as a factor in the negative return-volatility relationship. The aforementioned
loss aversion, for instance, is the primary affect heuristic in the focus of their analysis. Investors
trading on behalf of this heuristic influences the demand for equities, as they are more likely to
purchase stocks during non-volatile markets and sell them during volatile ones (Hibbert et al,
2008). This further carries over to the derivatives market (and subsequently the VIX), as traders
bid up prices for put options and ultimately implied volatility through extrapolation bias. They
argue that due to the fact that this relationship was occurring contemporaneously and with such
strong correlations in the tails, that this must be behavior driven and not the result a lagged effect
such as leverage or volatility feedback.

ANALYSIS

In order to truly understand the underlying cause of the negative relationship between
volatility and stock market returns, one must examine the association itself. Concordant with
French, Schwert, and Stambaugh in their analysis of volatility asymmetry, this paper uses the
market risk premium as a proxy for returns, because it takes into account several interest rate
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regimes throughout the sample range of January 2, 1990 to June 29, 2018. This paper also uses
the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) in reference to volatility, examining it in the context of implied
or conditional volatility. In agreement with Hibbert et al, the VIX provides a suitable
measurement for conditional volatility because of its inclusion of options extending across a
variety of strike prices and its constantly updating implied volatilities.
When the values of the change in the VIX and the risk premium are standardized and
plotted, the negative relationship becomes quite clear (Figure 3). Spanning over the
aforementioned time horizon, the correlation between the two variables is a staggering -0.789.
Examining the direction of the S&P 500 index returns on a daily basis compared to the VIX
yields similar results. From January 2, 1990 to March 3, 2019, the S&P 500 Index and the VIX
moved in opposite directions 77.79% of the time. The following table describes these
movements.
Table 2.

Figure 3.
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With such consistent movement in the opposite direction, one would expect a
significantly negative beta to the market. This is indeed the case, with a beta over the same span
of -4.288, using daily closing SPX and VIX data. This beta also changes depending on the type
of market. For example, for the sample period from January 1990 to February 2010, the beta of
the VIX versus the S&P 500 Index was -2.2 in bull markets, - 3.9 in bear markets, and -3.5
overall (Stanton, 2011).
The distribution of this relationship provides further insights. While much is documented
about the negative relationship between returns and conditional volatility, little is discussed
about the asymmetry of this relationship itself, rather than the relationship of solely volatility.
There are a few scholarly works that do address the fact that the relationship between returns and
volatility is nonlinear -- and thus becomes more significant during extreme shocks or periods
(Hibbert et al, 2008). Their focus is primarily on the downside case, in which large decreases in
the stock market price cause spikes in volatility through effects such as feedback or leverage.
This paper’s research expands beyond this view to incorporate the whole relationship -- why
does volatility decrease (increase) by an almost equal amount during a positive return shock
versus a negative one in absolute terms?
As mentioned previously, an essential part of the volatility-return relationship is that it is
nonlinear. If it was linear, then the impact of a negative return of one percent on volatility would
have a proportionate impact as a five percent negative return, and this is not the case. Following
the methodology of the Federal Reserve, a way to test for this relationship is through the
volatility of volatility; i.e. the derivative (Park, 2015). The CBOE VVIX (volatility of volatility)
Index derives its value using the same methodology as the VIX, except for the fact that it uses
VIX options instead of options from the S&P 500 Index (CBOE, n.d.). Plotted against the VIX, a
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positive relationship between the VIX and the VVIX would indicate that stock market volatility
is a nonlinear construct. The figure below illustrates the relationship from January 2, 1990 to
March 8, 2019 of their standardized daily returns, with an R-squared value of .56 and a test
statistic statistically significant beyond the 99th percentile.

Figure 4.

With nonlinearity established in the relationship between stock returns and conditional
volatility, examining the risk premium quintiles provides insight as to which periods or days are
contributing to this overall negative correlation. For this analysis, each risk premium and
volatility value on a daily basis were treated as a pair in the time series. Each quintile represents
the group of risk premium-volatility pairs that fell into the particular percentile ranking. As
illustrated by the plots in Appendix 1-5, the second, third, and fourth quintile display little to no
relationship between the change in volatility and the change in the risk premium. The first
quintile (lowest returns) and fifth quintile (highest returns), however, have a very strong negative
association. The table below summarizes the results for the following regression per quintile,
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controlling for the Fama French Factors of SMB (market capitalization) and HML (book to
market ratios).
Where:
𝒚𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝒗𝒊𝒙𝒕 + 𝜷𝒔𝒎𝒃𝒕 + 𝜷𝒉𝒎𝒍𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕
𝒚𝒕 = The standardized market risk premium at time t
𝜷 = The parameter of interest to estimate the relationship between different factors and the

market risk premium
𝒗𝒊𝒙𝒕 = The standardized value of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) at time t.
𝒔𝒎𝒃𝒕 = The standardized value of the aggregate SMB factor returns for the S&P 500 Index at
time t
𝒉𝒎𝒍𝒕 = The standardized value of the aggregate HML factor returns for the S&P 500 Index at
time t

Table 3:

*** indicates statistically significant at the 99% confidence level
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Similar results appear when analyzing the correlations of the market risk premium of the
S&P 500 Index versus the VIX from a decile perspective (Figure 5). The first and tenth deciles
both exhibit the strong negative correlation described in academic literature, but the second
through ninth decile exhibit very weak negative correlations with hardly any relationship at all. It
is the tenth decile that is of particular interest. Why does the VIX react so strongly negative to
large increases in the market risk premium or return?

Figure 5.

This finding contrasts several of the assumptions made earlier that helped support the
effects explaining asymmetric volatility. For instance, Campbell and Hentschel in their work
illustrating the volatility feedback effect relied upon the concept that volatility is persistent.
Thus, forecasted volatility is conditional on today’s volatility levels, and can often exhibit
momentum-like properties. This appears to be the case for the first quintile or decile, in which
large spikes in present-day volatility (via large negative stock returns) can reverberate into larger
21

implied volatilities in the future. However, a large spike in stock return volatility resulting from a
large increase in the market risk premium actually decreases future volatility, because investors
now believe there to be less volatility in future. Hwang et al in their study of volatility found a
lack of support for the persistency of true volatility -- a key input for the GARCH models used to
demonstrate the volatility feedback and leverage effects (Hwang et. al, 2007).
In regards to the leverage effect, the distribution of the relationship is better explained. As
the stock market decreases significantly (1st quintile), the relative level of equity compared to
debt decreases, causing the volatility to increase. Conversely, as the stock market experiences a
positive return shock (5th quintile), the leverage ratio decreases due to a larger proportion of
equity, resulting in lower volatility.
As the most open-to-interpretation explanation for the return-volatility relationship, the
investor behavior reasoning may have best chance of capturing the entirety of the relationship
distribution. Loss aversion does not only affect decisions relating to losses, but also spills over to
gains. On the negative return side, the investor sensitivity to losses is indicated by the extreme
volatility that accompanies the extreme negative return shocks in the first quintile and decile.
The fifth quintile (positive return shocks), however, can potentially be thought of as the
sensitivity to the lack of losses -- a higher sensitivity than an investor’s sensitivity to gains. A
large positive return in the stock market signals that the risk of losses has declined, leading to a
significant decrease in the implied/conditional volatility.
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Historical Analysis
Because the sample period spans nearly 30 years of data, it is also important to examine
the risk premium – volatility relationship in a historical context, throughout different eras of the
stock market. The first era in study was from the beginning of the sample (January 2, 1990) to
the end of the dot-com bubble, which ended at its lowest point at the end of September 2002.
During this time horizon, the S&P 500 Index returned a compounded annual return of 6.4%, with
an average VIX level of 19.86. The second era spanned from the endpoint of the dot-com bubble
to the end of the financial crisis, defined as ending in June 2009 by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER, 2012). While this period did not contain the same amount of trading
days, it encompassed both the bull market before the Financial Crisis as well as the ensuing
recession, with an average VIX level of 20.82 and the S&P returning approximately 1.78%
annually. The last era marked the beginning of a historically long bull market, starting on June
30, 2009 and spanning to the end of the sample on June 29, 2018. During this period, volatility
was rather low at an average VIX level of 17.44, while returns were much higher at 12.05%
annually.
Using the same approach as the overall relationship analysis, each era was divided into a
time series of risk-premium and VIX z-scores, which were then separated into quintiles. The
resulting correlations between the z-scores in each quintile are illustrated below (Figure 6). All
quintiles largely follow the same relationship as the entire time series, but the second era notably
contains more extreme correlations in the first and fifth quintile. This was largely the result of
the Great Recession falling within its sample, in which many extreme values of risk premiums
and volatility levels occurred. In contrast, the first era lacked as strong of a negative correlation
overall and in the quintiles of focus, alluding to the fact that the relationship has become stronger
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over time – perhaps due to increased volume and prevalence of high frequency trading. Further,
despite the low levels of volatility found in the bull market following the Great Recession, the
asymmetric relationship between returns and volatility remained very strong, emphasizing the
prevalence of volatility declines during positive return shocks.

Figure 6.

IMPLICATIONS

The defining characteristic of volatility-based instruments is the fact that they are
negatively correlated with the stock market and consequently the market risk premium. When
compared to other major asset classes or factors as listed by the St. Louis Fed hedge fund factors,
volatility stands alone in this regard. The following table illustrates the correlations of prominent
factors with the market risk premium over the time period from January 2, 1990 to June 30,
2018.
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Table 4.

The market of volatility based-instruments has grown substantially over the past decades
as investors sought to take advantage of the characteristics of stock market volatility. The
Chicago Board Options Exchange offers Volatility Index Futures in order to utilize as an
investment or hedging tool. Options on the VIX remain prevalent as well, with millions of
contracts bought and sold daily. There are also several exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and
exchange-traded funds (ETF) that attempt to track the VIX as a benchmark through volatility
futures, or even take leveraged or inverse positions on volatility. For example, the
VelocityShares Daily 2x Leveraged VIX Short-Term ETN attempts to track twice the return of
the VIX, and has over $800 million in assets under management (Yahoo Finance, 2019). There
are many ways to trade volatility -- but it is important to first understand the implications of the
return-volatility relationship.
This was not the case for the once-popular inverse volatility exchange traded note XIV,
which was created by Credit Suisse and had over $2 billion in assets under management. The
large spike in volatility on February 5, 2018 resulted in a decline in XIV of 85% in one day,
before being liquidated a few days later after losing most of its value (Franck, 2019). Its downfall
sheds light on some of the important aspects discussed in this paper. Volatility has a strong
negative correlation to the market return in aggregate, but the strongest relationship occurs
within the first and fifth quintiles. Extreme negative return shocks produce even more extreme
increases in volatility, while large positive return shocks result in extreme decreases in volatility.
Individuals or institutions investing in inverse volatility ETNs or shorting volatility instruments
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themselves should be wary of the leverage, feedback, and investor behavior effects that drive the
asymmetric relationship between stock market returns and conditional volatility. These can lead
to margin calls or significant fluctuations in value that one must be prepared to endure.

CONCLUSION

The stock market and volatility, as measured by the VIX, share a very strong negative
relationship. Two competing schools of research attempt to explain this phenomenon, primarily
through GARCH models of volatility. The volatility feedback effect finds reason in the process
of a negative return shock increasing volatility and raising the required return -- thus decreasing
the price and amplifying the level of volatility. Support has been found in emerging markets in
India, as well as in high-frequency tick-by-tick data, but lacks full explanation for the
instantaneousness of cost of capital revisions. A second school of thought, the leverage effect,
states that as asset prices decline, the debt to equity ratio increases, resulting in increased
volatility. This effect has significantly less explanatory power, and is called into question by
firms that are all-equity financed and still display the same characteristics of return-volatility
relationships. A final explanation encompasses several ideas through general investor behavior.
Because investors are more sensitive to losses, the potential of larger decreases in stock prices
due to higher volatility serves as reason to cause the negative relationship between returns and
volatility.
This paper furthers the academic research on these effects by taking a quintile and decile
approach, in order to examine the distribution of the volatility asymmetry. The relationship was
found to be nonlinear, with the first and fifth quintiles (i.e. the extremes) of the risk premium
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correlating the most negatively with the corresponding volatility time-series. These findings do
not appeal completely to the volatility feedback effect, particularly in the extreme positive
shocks to returns. They are better explained by the leverage and investor behavior effects, in
which the strong negative correlations in extreme quintiles could be a result of leverage or loss
aversion. They also have significant implications on the large volatility instrument market, in
which they help explain the extreme losses of certain exchange-traded notes, and provide
guidance to future investments in volatility.
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Appendix 1: RPm Quintile 1

Appendix 2: RPm Quintile 2
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Appendix 3: RPm Quintile 3

Appendix 4: RPm Quintile 4
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Appendix 5: RPm Quintile 5
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